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STATEMENT OF FACT
The respondent hereby accepts the appellants statement of facts so far as stated, but the
respondent de sires to amend, correct and supplement said appellants statement of fact as
follows:
The respondent recognizes that appellant,
Rex K. Chugg, at the time of the automobile accident in question, was insured under an automobile insurance policy executed by the respondent and
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properly deliver to appellant Chugg. The facts
of this case further show that appellent Chuggwa
under the influence of alcohol while driving one c
the automobiles in, and at the time of, the a c c]
dent involved herein, and that-driving while J.n
that condition was contrary to, and in violation
of the policy provision quoted .on Page 2 of the
appallent brief.
That the said policy form issued to the appallent Chugg was never filed for approval with
the State Insurance Commissioner as required
by law and was not in the form required by, nor
did it comply with, the provisions and requirements of the Utah Safety Responsibility Law.
It is also a fact in evidence that appellent Chugg,
prior to the date of the accident he rein involved,
had never been called upon, by the Division of
Safety and Financial Responsibility of the State
Department of Public Safety, to show proof of
financial responsibility as provided for and r~
quired under the provisions of the Utah Safety
Responsibility Act, when certain circumstances
exist and are present.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
For purposes of answering the points raised
by the appellent and to keep the arguments within those points, the respondent answers the appe
lents points under the following heads:
POINT NUMBER I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERR
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BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY AS TO THE ALCOHOL CONTENT OF A BLOOD SPECIMEN TAKEN
FROM THE APPELLENT.
Point Number 2.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN ADMITTIN"G TESTI110NY OF AN ENTRY OF THE APPELLENTS PLEA OF GUILTY
TO A CHARGE OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED WHICH CHARGE WAS FILED AND ENTERED AGAINST THEAPPELLENT IN THE LOGAN
CITY COURT .
Point Number 3 .

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN HOLffiNG THERE WAS GOOD AND
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLENT WAS INTOXICATEDWHILEDRNINGTHE
AUTOMOBILE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT.
Point Number 4.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THE RESPONDENT'S AUTOMOBILE POLICY OR ITS PROVISIONS, ESPECIALLY AS TO THE INTOXICATION CLAUSE INEFFECTNE, INOPERATIVE
OR OF NO EFFECT BECAUSE OF:
(a) THE POLICY HAVING NEVER
BEEN APPROVED OR FILED FOR AP-
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PROVAL WITH THE UTAH'S STATE
ANCE COMMISSIONERS OFFICE.

INSUR~

(b) THE FORM OF THE POLICY BEING
AT THE TIME OF THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CONTRARY TO THE FORM OF
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES REQUIRED BY THE UTAH SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT.
ARGUMENT
Point Number 1
Respondent submits that the law supports
the introduction of the evidence under the circumstances herein involved. All parties concede that the accident occurred on August 27,
1955 at about 9:15p.m" That defendant Chugg
was taken immediately to the Logan L. D. S.
Hospital that same evening. That a sample of
Chugg' s blood was taken that very evening at
the H::>spital (Tr. 26, 35) by Dr, Robert S. Budge,
who first observed and treated the defendant
Chugg at the scene of the accident and then had
him removed to the hospital.
Dr. Budge took
the blood sample (Tr. 27 & 36). It was sent to
the laboratory at the hospital where it was found
that defendant's blood had an alcohol content by
weight of zero point one seventy five (0 175) (Tr.
2 7) . Dr, Budge extracted the blood sample for
several reasons. One was because of his suspicion of drunkenes s and because State Highway
0
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patrolman Pitcher had ordered it
Also the
doctor was concerned for purely medical reasons to determine if the patient's unconscious
condition was due to alcohol or a blow on the
hea~ so as to be prepared to properly regulate
further and later treatment. (Tr, 36) Respondent concedes that no specific consent was
obtained for the blood sample but the evidence
shows that at no time was objection ever raised
even when the findings were used as evidence
against defendant Chugg in the City Court on a
charge of drunkeness. We submit this as an
implied consent and a waiver. (Tr, 45),
Respondent submits that no better chain of
proof could be forthcoming to establish the identity of the blood specimen and to connect it
to the defendant at the time of the accident.
It should be noted by this court that even
though tlie lower court refused to permit the
evidence of the blood tests and the evidence of
the plea of guilty to intoxication at the first
hearing (Tr. 26, 2 7, 30), then later because of
connecting evidence and a review of authorities, all this evidence was admitted and the
courts prior rulings withdrawn (Tr, 47 & 48).
Your honorable court has just recently
ruled on the rna tte r of taking a blood sample
without consent. It is 1n the case of Fretz vs
Anderson 300Pac . (2d)642-6
The facts are not
parallel, but if we interpret the courts decision
correctly, there is no objection to the introducSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion of evidence of blood samples, even though no
specific consent was given.
In the case of State v. Cram (Ore. 1945) 160

Pac. (2d) 283, we have a case parallel to our own
case.
The defendant was. ~ken to the hospital,
and while still unconscious, a blood sample was
taken at the request of the police officer and for
the doctor's use to determine further necessary .
treatment. Defendant was later charged with manslaughter and this evide·nce used against him but
no objection was raised, no motion made for sup~
pression of evidence or objection to the method of
blood extraction. We also have that condition in
the case before the court. We submit it is equiv ..
alent to consent. This case very thoroughly re- views the decisions, upholds the lowet court mallowing the evidence, and held that no rights of the.
defendant had been violated.

In the case of People v. Haeussler (Cal. 1953)
260 Pac. (2d) 8, 12 we have another case of taking
blood while the defendant was still unconscious,
for the dual purpose of an alcohol test and to de=
termine future treatment as the doctor in the case
before the court testified he also did (T. 36). The
California court also held no rights violated and
allowed the evidence to be admitted.
The following cases also support this rule:State v. Ayres(Ida. 1949)211 Pac. (2d) 142~
Block v. People(Co1o. 1951)240 Pac. (2d)512.
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The fact that the present case is a civil
case and not criminal makes no difference:
See Kuroske v, Aetna Life Insurance Company
(Wis.1940) 291N.W. 384, 25A_L.R. (2d) 1415,
See Wigmore on evidence Vol. VIII» Sec. 2265
and especially the recent supplement material.
Point Number 2,
Respondent submits that authorities are
overwhelming in number, allowing evidence of
a guilty plea in evidence under the circumstances
of this case. Open pleas of guilty in a court are
admissible in subsequent civil actions involving
the same offence. (20) Am. Juris,~ Evidence,
Sec. 648 p. 545). Courts are quite universal
in their application of the rule that convictions
after a trial on the evidence, are not admissible
but pleas of guilty are admissible, and the tendency of courts is to be more liberal in this regard even with convictions after trial ( 18 A. L. R,
(2d) 1289, 1290, 1307).
It would be multiplying words to say more
but Respondent would like to add that one of the
main reasons for this rule is that when such pleas
are made under the restrictions and hazards of
criminal prosecution, certainly the defendant
should have no cause to complain under the lesser strain of civil actions, Then a defendant
always has the privilege of explaining why he
entered his plea. May we suggest the f o 1-
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lowing case s as controlling :
Roper v. Scott (Ga, 1948) 48 S. E. (2)
118c
Morrissey v. Powell (Mass, 1939)23N.
E. (2d) 411.
McClainv. Allstate Life Ins. Co,.
(Ohio 1948) 80 N. E. (2d) 815. ·
Kochv. Elkins (Ida.l950) 225 Pac,(Zd)457.
Olsen v. Meachem(Cal. 1933)19 Pac. {2d)527.
People v. Oldsmobile Coupe (Cal.
1947) 181 Pac. (2d) 950-53.
Miller v. Blanton (Ark. 1948) 210 S. W.
(2d) 293.
The appellant has cited certain Utah sections
supplemented by a Minnesota .case. (Pages 7&8
of appellant' s· Brief). Whatever logic or v.eight
it might have, at best it is only a minority ruling. The respondent has in other ways shown
the defendant's drunkeness so that the record
of his plea is only supplementary but the respondent certainly is entitled to some way of showing intoxication when the defense is available in its policy and it is a legal defense.
Further a plea of guilty is a confession and a
statement against interest and should be given
full weight as such" Respondent submits that
where the very issue goes to the matter pleaded,
evidence of that plea or confession could be admitted in line with the authorities cited by respondent.
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Point Number 3.
looking at the overall picture of the question of intoxication, where it is as here, the basic issue of the lawsuit, certainly the courts
should allow the fact of intoxication to be proved
by some means that is possible and reasonable
within the realm of usual human relations. For
the sheer convenience of the court, the respondent has tried, in this case, to supply that evidence from every available source. A blood test
was taken, and it tested .out at a figure which our
law says is beyond a safe driving margin,
Our
law allows up to 0. 15% of weight (Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-44 (b)3) and there is no
question or dispute that the appellant's blood
tested 0. 175% by weight. Respondent does not
feel there is any question about the records supporting the fact that it was Chugg' s blood that was
tested on the night of the accident. We submit
that the law supports the respondent in all phases
of the results of that test being admissible as ev-idence. Respondent again submits that the defendent Chugg gave an implied consent to the blood
test and waived his rights, if any he had, to object to the test in that neither he nor his counsel
ever objected to the test, or asked for its return
or suppression as evidence. Timely objectives
must be raised to take advantage of cases of lack
of consent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

The respondent produced the record of
Chugg' s own confession (Tr, 28-29) and this C~Y. .1gg
verified on the witness stand (Tr. 45) and took his
opportunity to explain why he so plead.
Lastly the respondent put an officer on the
stand who by the appellant's own brief admits
was under the opinion defendant Chugg was intoxicated on the night of the accident. (Tr.l9 to 23,
incl.). The law permits such opinions and the
deputy sheriff gave several reasons to support his
opinion.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THERE IS NOT ONE
WORD OF EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONY EXCEPT DEFENDANT CHUGG'
ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO
INTOXICATION,
Point Number 4.
Our state law does require that a form of
all insurance policies must first be filed with the
State Insurance Commission before that policy
can be issued, delivered or used,
(U. C. A.
1 9 53 Sec. 3 1 - 1 9-9 ( 1) . A copy of the policy involved in this case, and sold and delivered by
the respondent to the defendant Chugg$ was never
filed with the Insurance Commissioner before the
accident
But respondent submits that an unap=
proved policy. even though issued, delivered and
used, remains enforceable in accordance with its
terms, except for provisions prohibited by Statute
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The Utah insurance code sets up no standards or
restrictions on the form of an automobile insurance policy or on required or prohibited Provisions. (See U.C.A. 1953 Sec. 31-19-35). The
appellant has referred; on page 10 of its Brief,
to a restriction set out in Utah's Safety Responsibility Act which under certain circumstances.
becomes a restriction on automobile policy provision in this state, but may I refer to that below.
The respondent briefly contends the following for the problems raised in Point Number 4:
The Safety Responsibility Act of Utah is
what is termed as a voluntary law. No one
is forced to buy insurance, nor is anyone in
any other way compelled to show evidence of
financial responsibility, when they procure
a drivers license. Proof of financial responsibility is not required until after the first
serious accident. Therefore the policy provisions required by the Safety Responsibility Act(U. C.A.l953 Sec~41~12-21 (f) can~
not be required in a policy until after the
first serious accident. The Financial ResJ:Xnsibility Division of the Department of Public
Safety have no control over this problem until the first accident. The State Insurance
Commissioner is only required by law to enforce the insurance Code of the State (U. C. A.
1953 Sec. 31 ~2 ... 1). As to Utah law which sets
up the requirements of what is, and when to
make, proof of financial responsibilitys see
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Sees. 41-12-1 (K), 3, Sa, Sb, Sc, 18, 19, 21,
2lf( 1), of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
This is the system used by states under the
voluntary system.
The respondent urges that in the cases
that where a policy has been issued with provisions contrary to the Safety Responsibility
Act BEFORE PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS BEEN DEMANDED the policy sets
up the contract between the insured and the insurer and they are bound by all its terms not
contrary to law. As explained above there was
no law prohibiting the respondent from inserting the Intoxication Exclusion Clause BEFORE
Proof of Financial Responsibility was required
of defendant Chugg, These policy provisions
are also binding on third party claimants under
the contract such as defenda.nt Willard A. Larsen
whose rights are no greater than the insured.
Please note that it was stipulated between theparties that if wiL:_esses were called, the testimony would be that defendant Chugg did not
have his license suspended nor had he ever
been called upon to show proof of financial responsibility prior to, or even after~ the accident.
(Line 28 of Page 5 to Line 30 of Page 6 of Supplemental Transcript Testimony taken November
21st, 1956). In support of these views the respondent submits the following:
Section 4297 in Vol. 7 of Insurance Law
by Appleman reads as follows:
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"Where the person insured was not
one required to qualify under a Finari:
cial Responsibility Statute (underlining
mine), even though a general form of
endorsement is contained in the policy,
it has been held that the rights of the
third persons are no greater than those
of the insured. Consequently the insurer has been permitted to set up a defe·nse
of lack of notice, failure to cooperate,
(under exclusions, etc.) restrictions as
to emergency use, like by an officer."
In the case of McCann v. Continental Casualty Co. (Ill. 1955) 128 N. E. {2d) 624, the insured had a policy covering only his family,
This policy was in conflict with the provisions
of the Financial Responsibility law which required a regular omnibus clause. This is a
third party plaintiff attempting to force coverage under the terms of an omnibus provi ""
sion. The court found that because of no prior
accidents and never having been called upon to
show proof of Financial Responsibility, the
Financial Responsibility Act of Illinois was
not applicable "unless the insured by his previous conduct had brought himself within its
purview". (627)lllinois was under a voluntary
and not a compulsory law as Utah.
This same rule is followed in the following case:
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Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v,
Georgiana (N, J, 1951) 82 Atl. (2d) 217,
This of course is submitted by the respondent in support of its claim that the ~efenda n t
Willard A. Larsen, would have no rights against
the respondent under the policy, or any of its pro. vis ions, written on defendant Chugg by the re spandent.
The cases just referred to show how the
courts hold where a voluntary law as Utah's is in
force, and its effect on the rights of the insured
and third parties b.efore proof of financial responsibility. It makes no difference that the policy
had not been filed and approved with the Insurance
Commissioner.
See:
Rogers v. Penn.Mutual Life (Pa.l94)
26 AtL (2d) 127, 129-30.
Herman v. Mutual Life Ins . Co. (Fa,
1939) 108 Fed. (2d) 678, 682.
Hopkins v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.
( N. Y . 1918) 121 N. E, 46 5.
Reddington v. Aetna Life Ins., Co. (N" Y.
1942) 34 N.Y . Supp. (2d) 957-60.
The appellants have referred this honorable
court to the compilation of cases in 1 A, L. R. (2d)
822 & 29 A. L . R. (2d) 811 as proof that the safety
responsibility restrictions were effective against
the policy herein involved before and at the time of
the accident. A rn.ere reading of the material in
those citations shows they apply to
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compulsory or mandatory laws and have no application to our Utah situation. All those cases
are decided under laws where the safety r esponsibility provisions are applicable fromthe beginning rather than where Proof of Financ4tl Responsibility must first be shown as
in Utah.
See also - 34 A. L. R. (Zd) 1293-98
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin (N-.H.
1951) 84 Atl. (2d) 823.
CONCLUSIONS
The respondent urges that the lower court
erred in neither of its decisions and that said
respondent is entitled to request this court to
uphold said lower court in the following:(a) That there was sufficient evidence
to prove defendant Chugg was driving
an automobile while under the influence
of alcohol contrary to law, and the terms
of his insurance policy with the respondent that all of the evidence pertaining thereto was properly admitted and the lower
court committed no error.
(b) That the Utah Safety Responsibility
Law is not a compulsory law so that before proof of financial responsibility is
required of an insured he is not subject
to the Financial Responsibility Laws;
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and that therefore the prov1s1ons of any automobile insurance policy would be binding on
the insured and any third party involved in an
accident with the insured and that said third
party would get no further rights than the insured; and that further, the Insurance Commissioner of this state does not have to enforce the Safety Responsibility laws and that
the mere fact that the automobile insurance
policy form herein involved was not filed and
approved by the respondent does not effect the
issues herein.
(c) And that more specifically, that defendant
Chugg was intoxicated, which made his automobile policy unenforceable; that because our
Utah Safety Responsibility Law is Voluntary
and not Compulsory in operation, that law was
not operative against defendant Chugg at the
time of the accident; that therefore the third
party Willard A. Larsen has no further rights
in, to, or as a result of the terms and conditions of said policy than those enforceable by
defendant Chugg; that the policy issued and delivered to defendant Chugg by the respondent
violated no provision of the Utah Insurance
Code and that all other findings and orders of
the lower court in its findings, conclusions
and decree be upheld by this honorable court.
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Respectfully submitted,

C. N. OTTOSEN
65 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent~
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